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8.1  Introduction 
Three waves of external crises have swept international capital markets 
during the 1990s: the European Monetary System crisis in 1992-93,  the 
collapse of the Mexican peso with its induced “tequila” effects, and, most 
recently, the financial crisis in East Asia. In Italy and Mexico, the currency 
crisis was followed by a sharp reversal in the current account; Italy went 
from a deficit of 2.4  percent in 1992 to an average surplus of close to 2 
percent in 1993-96  and Mexico from a deficit of 7 percent in 1993-94  to 
virtual balance in 1995-96.  A similar outcome has occurred in East Asia 
after the 1997 baht crisis and its aftermath, as table 8.1 shows. 
Are external crises characterized by  large nominal devaluations invari- 
ably followed by  sharp reductions in current account deficits? And what 
is  the impact of crises and reversals in current  account imbalances on 
economic performance? Our paper addresses these questions by charac- 
terizing real and nominal aspects of sharp external adjustments in low- 
and middle-income countries.  It presents  stylized facts associated with 
sharp reductions  in current  account  deficits (reversals) and with  large 
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Table 8.1  Current Account Reversals and Real Depreciation in Asia 
Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
Current account reversap  6.8  15.1  19.6  6.8  18.8 
Real depreciationh  40.5  21.9  18.0  14.1  19.6 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 
dDifference in the ratio of current account to GDP between 1998 and the average for 1995-97. 
”Real effective exchange rate depreciation between July 1997-December 1998 and January 1995-June 
1997 (period averages). 
nominal devaluations (currency crises) and examines what pre-event fac- 
tors are associated with macroeconomic performance  after such events 
occur. 
Recent episodes of external instability have stimulated new theoretical 
and empirical research on crises, in an attempt to provide a conceptual 
framework that helps to elucidate these traumatic events and, possibly, to 
improve policy design so as to minimize the likelihood of their occurrence. 
In principle, a reversal in capital flows can cause a currency crisis and 
force a reduction in current account deficits because sources of external 
financing dry up. However, a reversal can also occur in  response  to a 
change in macroeconomic policy designed to forestall the possibility of 
future speculative attacks or capital flow reversals, or as a consequence of 
a favorable terms-of-trade shock. Speculative attacks leading to currency 
crises can follow a collapse in domestic asset markets (as seems to have 
been the case recently in Asia), accumulation of short-term debt denomi- 
nated in foreign currency, a persistent real appreciation and deterioration 
of the current account (as was the case in Mexico), or a political choice 
to abandon a rigid exchange rate system (as was the case in the United 
Kingdom in 1992). 
How well does theory match the variety of these different experiences? 
So-called first-generation models of currency crises are built on an inevi- 
table collapse of a fixed exchange rate system, in which the central bank 
mechanically expands domestic credit, for example, by monetizing a per- 
sistent fiscal deficit (e.g., Krugman 1979; Flood and Garber 1984). After 
a period of gradual reserve losses, a perfectly foreseen speculative attack 
wipes out the remaining reserves of the central bank and forces the aban- 
donment of the fixed exchange rate.  Second-generation models  of cur- 
rency crises endogenize government policy (e.g., Obstfeld  1994). Private 
agents forecast the government’s choice as to whether or not to defend the 
peg, based on trading off short-term flexibility against long-term credibil- 
ity. The peg is abandoned either as a result of deteriorating fundamentals, 
as in first-generation models, or following a speculative attack driven by 
self-fulfilling expectations. Note that a self-fulfilling attack can (but need 
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The latest waves of currency crises referred to above have brought ex- 
planations of crises based on multiple equilibria or on contagion effects 
to the forefront (on the former see, e.g., Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 
1995; Jeanne and Masson 2000; among others; on the latter, Eichengreen 
et al. 1996; Calvo and Mendoza 1999; Jeanne 1997; Masson  1998)’ Em- 
pirical tests of crisis models use various indicators of fundamentals, such 
as the ratio of reserves to money, fiscal balance, and the rate of domestic 
credit creation. The issue is whether (some) fundamentals are steadily de- 
teriorating in the period leading up to a speculative attack or not. How- 
ever, it is difficult to infer from the data whether the collapse of the peg is a 
result of deteriorating fundamentals or self-fulfilling prophecies (see, e.g., 
Eichengreen et al. 1995; Krugman  1996). A growing body of research is 
devoted to studying the mechanics of crises in developing countries. Ed- 
wards (1989), who studied the link between devaluation, the current ac- 
count, and output behavior, is an important precursor of our work. Kamin- 
sky and Reinhart (1999), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), and 
Demirguq-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) focus on leading indicators of 
balance-of-payments  and  banking  crises;  Sachs, Tornell,  and  Velasco 
(1996b) explore the spillover effects of the Mexican crisis on other emerging 
markets; closest to our work, Frankel and Rose (1996) undertake a cross- 
country study of currency crashes in low- and middle-income countries. 
The focus of the literature on the intertemporal aspects of the current 
account goes back to work by  Sachs (1981, 1982) and follows up on our 
own research on current account sustainability (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 
1996a, 1996b) and on current account reversals (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 
1998). Recent empirical research in the area includes Debelle and Faruqee 
(1996), who undertake a cross-country study of determinants of the cur- 
rent account, Kraay and Ventura (2000), who argue that debtor and credi- 
tor countries respond asymmetrically to income shocks, and Lane and 
Perotti (1998), who investigate the impact of fiscal policy on the trade bal- 
ance in OECD countries. A number of authors have instead focused on 
capital account developments, and in particular on capital flows to emerg- 
ing markets, underlining the importance of both “push” and “pull” factors 
in explaining capital flows (see, e.g., Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1993; 
Corbo and Hernandez 1996; Fernandez- Arias 1996; Fernandez-  Arias and 
Montiel 1996). 
In this paper we  put together these related strands of literature and un- 
dertake a study of indicators and consequences of current account rever- 
sals and currency crises in a large sample of low- and middle-income coun- 
tries over the period 1970-96. We try to answer four questions: First, what 
1. Contagion effects, broadly defined, can (but need not) have “fundamental” origins; e.g., 
a large depreciation in a country can imply a loss of competitiveness and a decline in external 
demand for a neighboring country. Eichengreen et al. (1996) try empirically to distinguish 
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triggers large and persistent reductions in current account deficits? Sec- 
ond, what triggers sharp exchange rate depreciations (currency crises)? 
Third, what are the consequences of these events for output and consump- 
tion? Fourth, is there a link between current account reversals and cur- 
rency crises? Although our study does not focus directly on reversals in 
capital flows, it uses data on size and composition of external liabilities in 
its characterization of external crises, and it includes “push” factors, such 
as interest rates and economic growth in industrial countries, among fac- 
tors systematically associated with current account reversals and currency 
depreciation. Our findings concerning indicators of reversals and crises 
are in line with what is suggested by theoretical models, with both domes- 
tic factors (such as the level of reserves) and external factors (such as the 
terms of trade and world interest rates) playing a role in triggering rever- 
sals and crises. We also find that output performance before and after a 
currency crisis exhibits much more “continuity” than before and after a 
current account reversal, and that the majority of reversals are not pre- 
ceded or accompanied by a currency crisis. 
In undertaking  this empirical  exercise, we  attempt to characterize a 
broad set of  stylized facts associated with reversals and crises. However, 
caution must be exercised in interpreting these regularities as a reliable 
predictive model. The burgeoning analytical literature on financial crises 
has highlighted several mechanisms that can generate such an outcome: 
inconsistency between deteriorating fundamentals and the maintenance 
of a fixed exchange rate (Krugman 1979), self-fulfilling crises a la Obstfeld 
(1994), and models of crises based on bank runs a la Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) (Goldfajn and Valdes 1997; Chang and Velasco 1998). Although 
these mechanisms generating crises are different, the models point to an 
overlapping set of indicators (e.g., the level of reserves, the rate of growth 
in domestic credit, world interest  rates, etc.). Hence empirical exercises 
relating the probability of a crisis to a large set of indicators cannot dis- 
criminate between different explanations for crises. Failure to identify the 
(potentially different) mechanisms underlying crises limits the usefulness 
of these exercises as predictive tools because the reduced-form relation 
between crisis events and indicators averages the particular pattern of cri- 
ses prevailing in the sample, which may not be repeated in the future (as 
in the standard Lucas critique). In addition, policy inference is hindered 
by the fact that the crisis-generating mechanisms, which we  cannot disen- 
tangle, can have different policy implications (e.g., tight monetary policy 
is called for in a standard Krugman-type crisis, while a more flexible mon- 
etary policy is called for in the event of bank runs). 
8.2  Theoretical Determinants of Reversals and Currency Crises 
We  can cast the analysis of sharp reversals in the current account in 
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Krugman (1999). Consider a small open economy producing goods that 
are imperfect substitutes for traded goods produced abroad. Assume that 
the world marginal propensity to spend on the country’s product (set to 
zero for simplicity) is smaller than the country’s marginal propensity to 
spend on domestic goods, 1 -  p.  World demand for domestic exports is 
fixed at X. A share p  of both consumption and investment demand (C 
and I)  falls on foreign goods. Market clearing for gross domestic product 
Y implies 
Y  1(1  -  p)I + (1 -  p)C + px  = (1 -  k)I  + (1 -  p)(l -  s)Y + px, 
where s is the marginal propensity to save and p  is the relative price of 
foreign goods in terms of domestic goods (a measure of the real exchange 
rate). For given  Y and X it is possible to solve for p  as a function of in- 
vestment: 
Suppose that investment financing depends on external capital flows. A 
reversal in capital flows will cause a decline in investment and, for given 
output, a real depreciation. In terms of the transfer problem, the assump- 
tion that domestic residents have a higher marginal propensity to spend 
on domestic goods than do foreign residents implies that a transfer of 
resources from the home to the foreign country will  increase world de- 
mand for foreign goods and decrease demand for domestic goods, thus 
implying the need for a real depreciation. To the extent that domestic out- 
put falls, this will mitigate the need for a real depreciation because of the 
induced fall in supply of domestic goods. 
The first theoretical framework in which to describe currency crises was 
provided by Krugman (1 979) and Flood and Garber (1984). In this frame- 
work, the source of the crisis is an inconsistency between the exchange 
rate peg and the rate of domestic credit expansion that leads to a gradual 
depletion of foreign exchange reserves, culminating in a speculative attack 
in which the remaining reserves are wiped out instantly. The attack takes 
place once the “shadow exchange rate,” e’,  defined as the implicit floating 
exchange rate that would prevail once reserves are exhausted, equals the 
pegged rate, e.  In the simple monetary model on which this analysis is 
based, a measure of  the vulnerability to speculative attacks is usefully 
given by 
es -  1 - k(eRIM2) 
e 
-  - 
1 - q7r 
1 
where p is the base money multiplier, M2 is broad money, R is the level of 
foreign exchange reserves, q is  the interest semielasticity of the demand 
for money, and 7r  is the rate of credit expansion. In this context, Calvo 290  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
(1997) emphasizes the importance of the ratio eRIM2 and of the ratio of 
reserves to short-term debt as measures of the adequacy of international 
reserves. This class of models does not yield clear predictions with regard 
to the link between  exchange rate crises and the behavior  of  the trade 
balance. However, if  the model is amended to allow for capital controls 
(as in Wyplosz 1986) reserve depletion can take place through the current 
account as well, with trade deficits eventually leading to an exhaustion of 
reserves and a collapse of the peg. 
Chang and Velasco (1998) provide a link between the literature on bank 
runs and the literature  on international financial crises. A  reduction  in 
the availability of international liquidity can exacerbate the illiquidity of 
domestic banks, leading to a collapse in the banking system. This would 
cause an output decline and a collapse in asset prices. Under a fixed ex- 
change rate, a run on the banks becomes a run on the currency if the cen- 
tral bank attempts to act as a lender of last resort. For example, Korea’s 
banks  had sizable  short-term  foreign  currency  liabilities  and matching 
long-term foreign currency assets. At the beginning of the crisis foreign 
banks refused to roll over their short-term foreign currency assets vis-a- 
vis offshore and onshore Korean banks. The attempts by the central bank 
to shore up the foreign liquidity position of banks simply led to the rapid 
loss of foreign currency reserves and the collapse of the currency. 
Insofar as current account reversals occur in periods of economic dis- 
tress, with liquidity constraints due to a reversal in capital flows, we would 
expect a link between reversals and large currency depreciations. However, 
this may not be the case when reversals are induced by other factors, such 
as favorable terms-of-trade developments. The empirical work of the next 
three  sections characterizes  empirical  regularities  associated  with  both 
current account reversals and currency crashes, attempts to shed light on 
what  indicators provide  a  signal  of  the likelihood  of  these  events  oc- 
curring, and looks at whether reversals and currency crises are related. 
8.3  The Data 
Our data set consists of 105 low- and middle-income countries (48 Afri- 
can countries, 26 Asian countries, 26 countries from Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and 5 European countries). A complete list of countries is 
given in appendix A. In the empirical analysis we also make use of a re- 
duced sample, comprising  39  middle-income countries with population 
above one rnilliom2 These countries are indicated with an asterisk in ap- 
pendix A. The main source of data is the World Bank (World Tables and 
2. These countries had income per capita (Summers and Heston definition) above $1,500 
and population above one million in  1985, as well  as an average current account deficit 
during the sample period below  10 percent of GDP. Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  291 
World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance); appendix 
B describes data sources and definitions. In addition to standard macro- 
economic and external variables, the data set includes a number of finan- 
cial sector variables and variables reflecting the composition of external 
liabilities, whose role in determining the likelihood of external crises has 
been emphasized in the recent literature (see, e.g., Calvo 1997). The data 
belong to different categories: 
Macroeconomic  variables such  as economic  growth,  real  consumption 
growth, rate of investment, fiscal balance, and level of GDP per capita 
External variables such as the current account balance (exclusive and in- 
clusive of official transfers), real effective exchange rate, degree of real 
exchange rate overvaluation,l degree of openness to trade, and level of 
external official transfers as a fraction of GDP 
Debt variables such as the ratio of external debt to output; interest burden 
of debt as a fraction of GNP; shares of concessional debt, short-term 
debt; public debt, and multilateral debt in total debt; and ratio of FDI 
flows to debt outstanding 
Financial variables such as the ratio of M2 to GDP, credit growth rate, and 
ratio of private credit to GDP 
Foreign variables such as the real interest rate in the United States (as a 
proxy for world interest rates), rate of growth in OECD countries, and 
terms of trade4 
Dummy variables such as regional dummies, a dummy for the exchange 
rate regime that takes the value one if  the country’s exchange rate is 
pegged and zero otherwise, and a dummy that takes the value one if the 
country has an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program in place 
for at least six months during the year 
8.4  Indicators of Current Account Reversals 
In the definition of reversal events we  want to capture large and persis- 
tent improvements in the current account balance that go beyond short- 
run current account fluctuations as a result of consumption smoothing. 
The underlying idea is that “large” events provide more information on 
determinants  of  reductions  in  current  account  deficits than  short-run 
fluctuations. These events have to satisfy three requirements: 
3. For the CPI-based real effective exchange rate (period average = loo), an increase repre- 
sents a real appreciation.  The degree of real overvaluation, calculated using a bilateral rate 
vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, is for every country the percentage  deviation from the country’s 
sample average, as in Frankel and Rose (1996). Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) study the dynam- 
ics of real exchange rate appreciations and the probability of their “unwinding.” 
4.  For the terms-of-trade  index, we take for each country the average value over the sample 
to equal 100. An increase in the index represents an improvement in the terms of trade. 292  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
1. Average reduction in the current account deficit must be at least 3 
(5) percentage points of GDP over a period of three years with respect to 
the three years before the event. 
2.  The maximum deficit after the reversal must be no larger than the 
minimum deficit in the three years preceding the reversal. 
3.  The  average current  account  deficit must  be  reduced  by  at least 
one-third. 
The first and second requirements should ensure that we capture only re- 
ductions of sustained current account deficits, rather than sharp but tem- 
porary reversals. The third requirement is necessary to avoid counting as 
a reversal a reduction  in the current account deficit from, say,  15 to  12 
percent. 
Since we define events based on three-year averages, the actual sample 
period  during  which  we  can  measure  reversal events  is  1973-94.  Ac- 
cording to our definition, reversals can occur in consecutive years; in this 
case, however, they are not independent events. In the empirical analysis 
that follows we  therefore exclude reversals occurring within two years of 
a previous reversal. Table 8.2 summarizes the number of events according 
to different definitions. 
The first notable feature is that reversal events are by  no means rare. 
For example, for a 3 percent average reduction in the current account def- 
icit (excluding official current transfers), we find 152 episodes in 69 coun- 
tries; for a 5 percent reduction, 117 episodes in 59 countries. If we exclude 
reversals occurring within two years of a previous reversal, the total is 100 
episodes (77 for a 5 percent reduction). The geographical distribution of 
reversals is relatively uniform  across continents, once we  adjust for the 
number of countries in the sample. An analysis of the time distribution 
shows, not surprisingly, that a significant share of total reversals occurred 
in the period immediately following the debt crisis, as well as in the late 
1980s. The number of reversals during the 1970s is instead fairly  The 
size of the reversals is also noteworthy. For 3 percent events (excluding 
transfers), the median reversal (which is smaller than the average) is 7.4 
percentage points of GDP, from a deficit of 10.3 percent to a deficit of 2.9 
percent. Malaysia, for example, had an average current account deficit of 
over 11 percent in 1981-83,  but only of 2.5 percent in 1984-86. 
These numbers confirm that reversal episodes are associated with major 
changes in a country’s external position. What are their implications for 
the path of other macroeconomic and financial variables? In order to ad- 
dress this question, we follow a methodology developed in Eichengreen et 
5.  In this respect, note that several oil-producing countries in the Middle East (such as 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain) are excluded from the 
sample. Table 8.2  Current Account Reversals 
A. Geographical Distribution 
Size of ReversaP 
Latin America 
Africa  Asia  Europe  and Caribbean 
Total  (48 countries)  (26 countries)  (5 countries)  (26 countries) 
3%  (no transfers)  152  67  48  4  33 
5% (no transfers)  117  55  38  2  22 
5%,  window (no transfers)  77  35  22  1  19 
3%  167  76  48  4  39 
3%, window  107  47  30  3  27 
39’0, window (no transfers)  100  43  29  3  25 
B.  Time Distribution 
Size of Reversal’  Before 1978  1978-81  1982-85  1986-89  1990-94 
3% (no transfers)  7  17  66  41  21 
3%, window (no transfers)  7  14  41  23  I5 
5% (no transfers)  4  13  54  35  12 
5%, window (no transfers)  4  10  34  21  8 
3%  7  20  67  49  24 
3%, window  7  17  39  29  15 
aReversal of 3 (5)% is a reduction in the current account deficit by at least 3 (5) percent over three years with respect to the preceding three years. “No 
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Note: Data for 100 reversals from 105 countries, 1970-96.  A reversal is defined as an average 
improvement in the current account (net of  official transfers) of at least 3 percent over a 
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not within three years of a reversal. For each variable, the plots depict the difference between 
the variable mean during turbulent periods and its mean during periods of tranquility, as 
well as the 2-standard-deviation band. The upper left-hand panel depicts instead the differ- 
ence between the medians during the two periods. Scales and data vary by panel. 
Current account reversals: whole sample 
al. (1995). The basic idea of this event-study methodology is to distinguish 
between periods of “turbulence”-here  those within three years of a re- 
versal event-and  the remaining, “tranquil” periods. Graphs allow a com- 
parison of variables during turbulent periods with their (average) values 
during tranquil periods. 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 depict the behavior of a set of variables during peri- 
ods of turbulence (around the time of reversals) for the whole sample and 
for the reduced sample comprising thirty-nine middle-income countries, 
respectively. Each panel shows deviations of  these variables from their 
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Note: Data for 47 reversals from 39 countries, 1970-96.  See fig. 8.1 note. 
Current account reversals: middle-income sample 
which plots the median rate of depreciation in turbulent periods, as a devi- 
ation from the sample median in tranquil periods. The plotted values for 
the remaining panels refer to reversal events and are the means (plus or 
minus 2 standard deviations) of the variable during each year of the rever- 
sal episode (from t -  3 to t + 3) as a deviation from the sample mean of 
the variable during tranquil periods. Hence a positive value for a variable 
indicates that it tends to be higher in turbulent than in tranquil periods.6 
The figures show that the real exchange rate starts out more appreciated 
than average before reversal periods and then depreciates throughout the 
6. One potential problem with this methodology is that the time distribution of reversal 
episodes is concentrated in the 1980s, and therefore the characteristics of the reversal events 
we identify are in part influenced by the characteristics of the 1980s with respect to the 1970s 
and the 1990s. However, the graphs restricted to the 1980s show the same overall pattern as 
fig. 8.1. 296  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
period. This comovement between the real exchange rate and the current 
account is clearly in line with the standard analysis of the transfer prob- 
lem. The panel depicting the behavior of the nominal exchange rate shows 
indeed an acceleration in the median rate of currency depreciation that 
occurs a couple of years before reversals. Reversals tend also to be pre- 
ceded by unfavorable terms of trade, low foreign exchange reserves, a high 
interest burden of external debt, low consumption growth, and a high but 
declining fiscal deficit. After a reversal occurs, reserves tend to rise, and 
the fiscal balance continues to improve, and the real exchange rate to de- 
preciate. Note also that no clear pattern for output growth characterizes 
the period preceding or following a reversal. This finding runs counter to 
the conventional wisdom that sharp reductions in current account deficits 
reflect an external crisis and that they are achieved by protracted domestic 
output compression so as to reduce import demand. 
We  then use multivariate probit analysis to examine whether a set of 
explanatory variables helps to predict whether a country is going to experi- 
ence a reversal in current account imbalances. More specifically, we esti- 
mate the probability of a reversal occurring at time t (meaning a 3 percent 
average decline in the current account deficit between t and t  + 2 with 
respect to the period between t - 1 and t -  3) as a function of variables 
at  t - 1 and of contemporaneous exogenous variables (terms of trade, 
industrial country growth, and world interest rates). The choice of the set 
of explanatory variables is motivated by existing research on currency and 
banking crises, as well  as by  our previous work comparing episodes of 
persistent current account deficits, which identified a number of potential 
indicators of sustainability. Among them we  include the current account 
deficit (CA), economic growth (GROW), investment rate (INV), GDP per 
capita  (GDP),  real  effective exchange rate  (RER),  openness  to  trade 
(OPEN), foreign exchange reserves as a fraction of imports (RES), exter- 
nal official transfers as a fraction of GDP (OT), ratio of external debt to 
GDP (DEBTY), share of concessional debt in  total debt (CONRAT), 
share of public debt in total debt (PUBRAT), and ratio of credit to GDP 
(CRED-a  proxy for financial development). Other variables, such as the 
ratio of FDI flows to GDP (FDI) and the share of short-term debt in total 
debt (SHORT) were excluded from the probit because they turned out to 
be  economically  and statistically  insignificant.  We  excluded the  fiscal 
deficit because of problems with data availability-it  did not enter sig- 
nificantly in the probit analysis, and it reduced sample size considerably. 
Note that the definition of  the event is based on changes in the current 
account balance, and we therefore believe it is important to control for the 
level of the current account balance prior to the reversal. 
Among the “exogenous” variables we include the lagged and contemp- 
oraneous real interest rate in the United States (RINT-as  a proxy for 
world  interest  rates),  lagged  and contemporaneous  rate  of  growth  in Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  297 
OECD countries (GROECD), lagged level of the terms of trade (TT), and 
change in the terms of trade in the reversal period (ATT(t + 1)). We  also 
use the dummy for the exchange rate regime (PEG) and the dummy for an 
IMF program  (IMF).’  For  some of  the  lagged  explanatory  variables, 
namely, the current account, the rate of growth, and the investment share, 
we  use a three-year average (over the period t - 1 to t -  3) rather than 
their level at t -  1, to ensure consistency in the way we  measure reversals. 
It is clearly incorrect to interpret this probit analysis in a “structural” 
way, given that many of the explanatory variables are endogenous. Never- 
theless, the analysis can provide a useful multivariate statistical character- 
ization of reversal events as well as identify potential “leading indicators.” 
Probit results are presented in table 8.3. 
Overall, the empirical analysis identifies a number of robust predictors 
of reversals in current account imbalances, regardless of the sample defi- 
nition: 
Current account deficit. Not surprisingly, reversals are more likely in coun- 
tries with large current account deficits. This result is consistent with 
solvency and willingness-to-lend considerations. 
Foreign  exchange  reserves.  Countries  with  lower  reserves (expressed in 
months of imports) are more likely to experience reversals. Clearly, low 
reserves make it difficult to sustain large external deficits and may  re- 
duce the willingness to lend of foreign investors. The ratio of reserves 
to M2, indicated by Calvo (1997) and others as a key predictor of bal- 
ance-of-payments crises, also appears to signal reversals ahead of time 
in our sample. 
GDPper capita. Countries with higher GDP per capita are more likely to 
experience reversals. The coefficient on this variable captures the diffi- 
culty extremely poor countries have reversing external imbalances. The 
positive coefficient is  also consistent with the theory of  stages in  the 
balance of payments: as a country gets richer, a reduction in deficits (or 
a shift to surpluses) is more likely. 
Terms of  trade.  Reversals seem more likely  in  countries with worsened 
terms of trade. One interpretation of this finding is that countries that 
have suffered terms-of-trade deterioration are more likely to experience 
reversals of  capital flows and may  therefore be forced to adjust. The 
evidence is  also in line with what is suggested by  Kraay and Ventura 
(2000), since the countries in our sample are almost entirely net debtors, 
and by  Tornell and Lane (1998), who argue that the “common pool 
problem” may be exacerbated by favorable terms-of-trade shocks, thus 
leading to a more than proportional increase in absorption. 
7. Santaella (1996) and Knight and Santaella (1997) study the determinants of IMF pro- 
grams and characterize the stylized facts that precede them. Table 8.3  Indicators of Reversals 
No Adjacent Events 
With Adjacent 
Events:  Middle-Income 
Full Sample  Full Sample  Average CA > -  10%  Countries 
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Note: Dependent variable takes the value one if a reversal of at least 3 percent takes place at time t + 1,  and zero otherwise. Estimation by probit. The table 
reports probit slope derivatives (and associated z-statistics in parentheses) multiplied by  100. Standard errors are corrected using the HuberlWhite sandwich 
estimator of variance. The variables CA, GROW, and INV are averages over the three years preceding the event. The variables OPEN, CONRAT, PUBRAT, 
OT, RER, TT,  GDP, RINT, and GROECD are levels. The first three probits include continent dummies (coefficients not reported). Omitted variables in 
models (3) and (4) were excluded based on a joint F-test. 
*Statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 300  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
We also find some evidence that reversals are more likely in countries 
with high investment. Insofar as high investment contributes to export ca- 
pacity, it can lead to a narrowing of external imbalances. Reversals also 
appear less likely in countries that peg their exchange rates. If a peg pre- 
cludes an adjustment in the nominal (and real) exchange rate, it can ham- 
per the reduction of external imbalances. 
When we  consider the full sample, which includes a large number of 
very poor countries, we find the following additional indicators: 
Concessional debt. The higher the share of concessional debt in total debt, 
the less likely a current account reversal. Concessional debt flows are 
less likely to be reversed, and they are likely to be higher in those coun- 
tries that have more difficulties reducing their external imbalances and 
servicing their external obligations. The statistical significance of the 
share of concessional debt vanishes once we exclude the poorest coun- 
tries from our sample, and therefore the variable was excluded from the 
last probit model (table 8.3, col. [4]). 
Oficial international  transfers. A  current  account  reversal is  less likely 
when official transfers are high. Clearly, higher official transfers reduce 
the need to adjust the current account (we are measuring the current 
account net of such transfers). 
OECD growth. Reversals in developing countries are more likely to occur 
in  years when  the growth  rate  in industrial  countries is high.  High 
growth increases the demand  for exports from developing countries, 
helping to narrow current account deficits. 
US.  interest rates.  Reversals are more likely after a period  of high real 
interest rates in industrial countries. High real interest rates increase the 
cost of borrowing for developing countries and reduce the incentive for 
capital to flow to developing countries. 
Note that the coefficient on the level of external debt has the wrong sign 
in the first two probit models, reflecting the fact that several poor countries 
are highly indebted  but have persistently  high current account  deficits, 
without reversals. Indeed, when these countries are eliminated from the 
sample the coefficient on external debt changes sign (see cols. [3] and [4]). 
Reversals do not appear to be systematically correlated with GDP growth 
before the event; we also do not find significant links between the level or 
rate of change of the real exchange rate (or degree of overvaluation) before 
the event and current account reversals (see, however, section 8.5). This 
finding is, of course, conditional on a given initial current account deficit 
(see also figs. 8.1 and 8.2). 
Table 8.4 shows the goodness of fit of the probit model, under the as- 
sumption that a crisis is correctly predicted if the estimated probability is 
above 0.5. Note that the fit improves considerably when we eliminate very 
poor countries. This is not surprising-indeed,  one can think  that  the Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  301 
Table 8.4  Goodness of Fit: Reversal Models 
Predicted 














1,186  7  1,193 
101  7  108 
1,287  14  1,301 
Model (2) 
972  4  976 
60  8  68 
1,032  12  1,044 
Model (3) 
695  6  70 1 
44  17  61 
739  23  762 
444  4  448 
28  13  41 
412  17  489 
Model (4) 
determinants of swings in the current account can differ substantially be- 
tween countries that rely exclusively on official transfers, mostly on con- 
cessional terms, and those that have more access to international capital 
markets. 
The results presented so far have to be interpreted taking into account 
the fact that the empirical analysis aggregates reversal events that have 
quite different features; it includes such full-fledged balance-of-payments 
crises as, say,  Mexico  1982 and  improvements  in  the  current  account 
spurred by favorable terms-of-trade developments or timely corrections in 
macroeconomic policy. A better understanding of the dynamics of current 
account reversals and of the role of economic policy will require a classifi- 
cation  of  these  events  based  on their  salient  features  (terms-of-trade 
shocks, swings in capital flows, etc.). This would provide an opportunity 
for a closer match between intertemporal models of current account deter- 
mination and developing country data. 
8.5  Current Account Reversals and Output Performance 
This section examines the behavior of output growth in countries that 
experienced sharp reductions in current account imbalances. We focus on 
two issues: first, whether reversals are costly in terms of output and, sec- 
ond, what factors determine a country’s rate of growth during a reversal 
period. Output costs clearly arise when reversals are associated with mac- 
roeconomic crises and more generally can be due to macroeconomic ad- 302  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
justment  and sectoral reallocation  of resources. For the purpose of this 
“before and after” analysis we selected the 3 percent event definition and 
we eliminated adjacent events.8  This identifies 100 reversal episodes for the 
definition excluding official transfers. 
The first interesting finding is that the median change in output growth 
between  the period after and that before the event is around zero, sug- 
gesting that reversals in current account deficits are not necessarily associ- 
ated with domestic output compression. However, output performance is 
very heterogeneous. For example, Uruguay’s average growth was -  7 per- 
cent in the period 1982-84,  compared to 4 percent in the period 1979-81; 
Malaysia went instead from growth of 2.4 percent in 1984-86  to growth 
of close to 8 percent over the following three years. 
Our dependent variable in the regression analysis is the average rate of 
output growth during the three years of the reversal period, as a deviation 
from the OECD average during the same period. We take the deviation of 
growth from the OECD average because reversal events occur in differ- 
ent years, and we  want to (roughly) correct each country’s performance 
for the overall behavior of the world  economy during that period. Our 
explanatory  variables  include  average growth (also as a deviation  from 
the OECD average), average investment, average current account balance, 
GDP  per capita (a “conditional convergence” term), ratio of external debt 
to GDP (DEBTY), overvaluation of the real exchange rate, official trans- 
fers, and U.S. real interest rates. They are all dated prior to the rever~al.~ 
Results are presented in table 8.5. 
The table shows that countries more open  to trade and with less ap- 
preciated  levels of the exchange rate before the event are likely to grow 
faster after the event. The size of the point estimates indicates that the 
effects of these variables are also economically significant: for example, a 
country that has an overvaluation of 10 percent before the reversal is likely 
to grow 0.7 percent slower for the following three years. We also find some 
evidence that countries with high external debt and those that receive high 
official transfers  tend to grow more slowly. The latter  finding could of 
course simply reflect the fact that poor countries that grow slowly tend to 
receive large transfers. Indeed, when we  exclude countries with low per 
capita income, the coefficient on official transfers  changes sign and be- 
comes statistically insignificant (regression  not reported). Note also that 
the correlation between growth before and after the event is low and statis- 
tically insignificant, with the exception of the regression for the group of 
middle-income countries. 
Overall, the empirical analysis seems to provide a reasonable character- 
8. In Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) we grouped events occurring in adjacent years for 
the same country, counting them as  a single, longer lasting reversal. 
9. All averages are calculated over the three-year period preceding the reversal. The per- 
centage change in the terms of trade between the two periods was statistically insignificant 
and was excluded from the regression so as to increase sample size. Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  303 
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Table 8.5  Consequences of Reversals 
Regional Dummies 
Average CA  Middle-Income 
Variable  Full Sample  Full Sample  > -10%  Countries 
Lagged dependent  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.32** 
variable  (0.1 1)  (0.1 1)  (0.10)  (0.12) 
CA  -0.10  -0.14*  -0.13  -0.07 
(0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
(0.017)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.023) 
OPEN  0.030**  0.021*  0.026**  0.031 * 
(0.01  1)  (0.01  1)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
(0.07)  (0.079)  (0.01  1)  (0.009) 
(0.17)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.18) 
(0.11)  (0.10)  (0.35) 
(2.4E-4)  (2.6E-4)  -2.9E-4  ( -  2.8E-4) 
OVERVA  -0.076**  -0.078**  -0.069**  -0.070** 
DEBTY  -0.018**  -0.016**  -0.018  -0.025** 
RINT  -0.23  -0.29*  -0.20  -0.42 
OT  -0.29**  -0.31**  -0.55 
GDP  -3. I E-4  -  1.4E-4  -3.OE-4  -  1.6E-4 
INV  0.058  0.067  -0.067  -0.037 
(0,044)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.067) 
R2  0.35  0.40  0.44  0.58 
N  84  84  66  44 
Note: Dependent variable is  output growth during reversal period, a three-year  average, 
expressed as deviation from the OECD average during the same period. Estimation by OLS 
with White’s correction for heteroskedasticity. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
The explanatory variables CA and INV are averages over the three years preceding the event; 
the variables OPEN, GDP, RER, TT, OT, and DEBTY are levels the year before the event. 
*Statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
ization of short- or medium-run output performance during periods of 
substantial reduction in external imbalances. A noteworthy finding is that 
reversal events seem to entail substantial changes in macroeconomic per- 
formance between the period before and the period after the crisis but are 
not systematically associated with a growth slowdown. 
8.6  Predictors of Currency Crashes 
In this section we  extend and refine work by Frankel and Rose (1996), 
by considering a longer sample and alternative definitions of currency cri- 
ses. We  use four definitions of currency crises; the first (CRISISl), used 
by Frankel and Rose (1  996), requires an exchange rate depreciation vis-a- 
vis the dollar of 25 percent, which is at least 10 percent higher than the 
depreciation the previous year. The main problem with this definition is 
that it considers as a crisis an episode in which the rate of  depreciation 304  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
increases from, say,  50 to 61  percent. To  avoid capturing the large ex- 
change rate fluctuations associated with high-inflation episodes, the sec- 
ond definition (CRISIS2) requires, in addition to a 25 percent deprecia- 
tion, at least a doubling in  the rate of depreciation with respect to the 
previous year and a rate of depreciation the previous year below 40 per- 
cent. The third and fourth definitions (CRISIS3 and CRISIS4) focus on 
those episodes in which the exchange rate was relatively stable the previous 
year and that therefore may be closer to the concept of currency crisis 
implicit in theoretical models. CRISIS3 requires a 15 percent minimum 
rate of depreciation, a minimum 10 percent increase in the rate of depre- 
ciation  with  respect  to the  previous  year,  and a  rate  of  depreciation 
the previous year of below 10 percent. Finally, CRISIS4 is analogous to 
CRISIS3 with the additional requirement that the exchange rate be pegged 
the year before the crisis. 
We do not consider as a crisis any event that occurs within three years 
of another crisis; we  therefore construct a “window” around each crisis 
event that is distinguished from periods of tranquility. This reduces the 
total number of crises; table 8.6 summarizes the currency crisis episodes 
according to the different definitions. 
There is clearly a large degree of overlap between these definitions of 
crises. Practically all episodes in CRISIS2 (1 38 of them) are also episodes 
of CRISIS1.I0 The overlap between CRISIS3 and CRISIS1 (or CRISIS2) 
is smaller (109 cases) but still significant. Note also that the number of 
“crashes” depends crucially on whether one counts countries that experi- 
enced a crash or currencies that crashed. The six members of the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Union (Cameroon, Central African Re- 
public, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon), the seven members 
of  the West  African  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cbte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) plus the republic of 
the Comoros share the same currency (the CFA franc), which was set at a 
fixed rate vis-a-vis the French franc until  1994 and then devalued by  50 
percent.” Our definition of crisis therefore captures fourteen country epi- 
sodes that  year,  and  also in  1981 (because  of  the depreciation of  the 
French franc vis-a-vis the dollar). 
The geographical distribution of  currency crashes shows that African 
and Latin American countries tend to experience more crashes than Asian 
countries (adjusting by  the number of countries in the sample). Recall, 
however, that the recent Asian currency crashes are not in the sample. The 
time distribution of currency crashes is more uniform than the distribution 
of reversals, with the highest number  of crashes in  the early 1980s (the 
period of the debt crisis) and, more surprisingly, in the early 1990s. The 
10. The effects of windowing account for the CRISIS2 episodes that are not also CRISIS1. 
11. Technically, the Islamic Federal Republic of Comoros uses a different currency, the 
CV, which is tied to the French franc in an analogous fashion to the CFA. Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  305 
Table 8.6  Currency Crashes 
A. Geographical Distribution 
Latin America 
and 
Type of  Africa  Asia  Europe  Caribbean 
Crisis”  Total  (48 countries)  (26 countries)  (5 countries)  (26 countries) 





no window  168 (142)  85 (59)  30  6  47 
window  172 (146)  81 (55)  30  7  54 
window  I42 (116)  73 (47)  27  4  38 
window  162 (136)  84 (58)  33  7  38 
window  119  67 (41)  17  7  28 
B. Time Distribution 
Type of  Before 






no window  15  33 (20)  33  29  52 (39)  6 
window  16  32 (19)  37  26  53 (40)  8 
window  14  30 (17)  28  20  45 (32)  5 
window  29  36 (23)  30  18  41 (28)  8 
window  21  30 (17)  19  14  30 (17)  5 
Note: Numbers in parentheses count the depreciation of the CFA franc as a single crash. 
“CRISIS1: depreciation  of  25 percent, at least  10 percent  higher than  the previous year. CRISIS2: 
depreciation of 25 percent, at least double the previous year, with the latter below 40 percent. CRISIS3: 
depreciation of  15 percent, at least 10 percent higher than the previous year, with the latter below 10 
percent. CRISIS4: same as CRISIS3 plus pegged exchange rate the year before the crisis. “Window” 
excludes crises occurring within three years of another crisis. 
increase in capital mobility during the latter period may be one possible 
explanation of this pattern. 
Table 8.7 summarizes changes in the exchange rate regime in countries 
that suffered currency crashes. In the whole sample, the exchange rate is 
pegged 69 percent of the time. The data show that a number of countries 
abandon the exchange rate peg the year of the crisis, and a few more the 
following year. 
As in the case of current account reversals, we present in figures 8.3 and 
8.4 some evidence on the behavior of key  variables around the time of 
















Table 8.7  Currency Crashes and Exchange Rate Regime 
Peg Year  Peg Year  Peg Year 
Type of Crisis  Totala  before Crisis  of Crisis  after Crisis 
CRISIS1, window  I64  99  87  79 
CRISIS2, window  136  97  83  76 
CRISIS3, window  146  1 I4  98  89 
CRISIS4, window  115  115  95  87 
=Total number of crises for which data on exchange rate regime before and after crisis are 
available. 
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Fig. 8.3  Currency crashes: whole sample 
Note: Data for 142 crashes from 105 countries,  1970-96.  A crash is defined as a nominal 
exchange rate depreciation of at least 25 percent, which is at least double the previous year’s 
depreciation rate, as long as the latter is below 40 percent. “Turbulent” periods are those 
within three years of a currency crash, and “tranquil” periods are those that are not within 
three years of a crash. For each variable, the plots depict the difference between the variable 
mean during turbulent periods and its mean during periods of tranquility, as well as the 2- 
standard-deviation band. The upper left-hand and middle panels depict instead the differ- 
ence between the medians during the two periods. Scales and data vary by  panel. Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  307 
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Fig. 8.4  Currency crashes: middle-income sample 
Note: Data for 51 crashes from 39 countries, 1970-96.  See fig. 8.3 note. 
respectively (the graphs refer to CRISIS2-the  graphs for the other types 
of crises are similar and are available on request). The upper left-hand and 
middle panels of figures 8.3 and 8.4 depict the behavior of the median rate 
of depreciation and of CPI inflation around the time of a currency crash, 
as deviations from the sample median during periods of tranquility. The 
other panels depict deviations from means and standard error bands (as 
in fig. 8.1 and 8.2). For the whole sample, the median rate of depreciation 
prior to crises is below 2 percent, close to the sample median; the median 
depreciation the year of the crisis is 53 percent, and after the crisis, it falls 
to 17 percent. A similar pattern emerges for the rate of inflation, although 
the increase during the year of the crisis is much smaller than the increase 
in the rate of depreciation. This is reflected in the behavior of the real ex- 
change rate (or the degree of overvaluation): these increase prior to the crisis 
and fall the year of the crisis, and they do not seem to recover within the 
three-year window. Another notable feature of crisis years (and of the year 
preceding a crisis) is a decline in the rate of output and consumption growth, 308  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
with  a rebound taking place  after the  crisis. The median consumption 
growth rate over the three years preceding a crisis is 3.3 percent, the year of 
the crisis, 0.2 percent, and the following three years, 2.2 percent. For out- 
put growth, we get 2.6, 1.4, and 3.1 percent, respectively. Not surprisingly, 
foreign exchange reserves around crisis periods tend to be lower than dur- 
ing tranquil periods and the terms of trade less favorable. There is some 
evidence that current account deficits are larger before crises than in tran- 
quil periods; however, the figures show an improvement in the current 
account position after the devaluation only for middle-income countries. 
We turn now to multivariate probit analysis. We estimate the probability 
of a currency crisis at time t + 1 as a function of a set of explanatory var- 
iables at time t and of external factors at time t and t + 1. The set of ex- 
planatory variables is similar to the set we  used for reversals; here we also 
report results using the ratio of reserves to M2 (RESM2) as an alternative 
to reserves measured in months of imports (RES). Results are presented 
in table 8.8. Columns (1) through (4) report probit analysis using the full 
sample and the four different definitions of crises, while columns (5) and 
(6) report the results for the sample of thirty-nine middle-income coun- 
tries. Overall, these results suggest some robust leading indicators of cur- 
rency crashes, regardless of the precise definition of crash: 
Foreign exchange reserves. Crashes are more likely in countries with low 
foreign exchange reserves, measured as a fraction of  imports or as a 
fraction of M2.I2 This finding is clearly in line with theoretical models 
of currency crises. 
Real exchange rate overvaluation. Crashes are more likely in countries in 
which the real exchange rate is appreciated relative to its historical aver- 
age. This finding suggest that even the crude measure of exchange rate 
misalignments adopted here provides some useful information on the 
likelihood of exchange rate collapse.I3 
US. interest rates. Crashes are more likely when real interest rates in the 
United States are (or have been) high. Higher interest rates in industrial 
countries make investment in developing countries less attractive and 
are more likely to cause reversals in capital flows. 
Growth in industrial countries. Crashes are more likely if growth in indus- 
trial countries has been sluggish. A possible channel is through lower 
demand for developing country exports, a decline in foreign exchange 
reserves, and a more likely collapse of the currency. 
Terms oftrade. A crisis is less likely when the terms of trade are favorable. 
12. The regressions using RESM2 instead of RES are not reported but are available from 
the authors. Klein and Marion (1997) report similar results using the ratio of reserves to MI 
for a sample of Latin American countries. 
13. A potential problem with this finding is that the definition of the benchmark as the 
sample average implies a tendency for mean reversion. Table 8.8  Indicators of Currency Crashes 
Full Sample  Middle-Income Countries 
CRISIS1  CRISIS2  CRISIS3  CRISIS4  CRISIS2 
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-0.06* Table 8.8  (continued) 
Full Sample  Middle-Income  Countries 
CRISIS1  CRISIS2  CRISIS3  CRISIS4  CRISIS2  CRISIS3 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
TT 
ATT(t + 1) 
RINT 
RINT(t + 1) 
GROECD 







































































































Note: Dependent variable takes the value one if a currency crash occurs at time t + 1, and zero otherwise. Estimation by  probit. The table reports probit 
slope derivatives (and associated z-statistics in parentheses) multiplied by  100. The variables CA, GROW, and INV are averages over the three years preceding 
the event. Variables are dated at time t unless otherwise marked. Regressions include continent dummies (coefficients not reported). Omitted variables in 
models (5)  and (6) were excluded based on a joint F-test. 
*Statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  31  1 
This is another intuitive finding: better terms of trade should improve a 
country’s creditworthiness (and its cash flow) and make it less vulner- 
able to speculative attacks. 
When we  use the whole sample, a number of other factors are good 
leading predictors of crisis according to CRISIS1 and CRISIS2, but not 
CRISIS3 and CRISIS4: 
Share of  concessional debt. Crashes are less likely in countries with large 
shares of debt on concessional terms. This may be explained by the fact 
that these flows are less likely to be reversed. 
Openness. More open economies are less likely to suffer exchange rate 
crashes. This evidence suggests that when we  include crises associated 
with high-inflation episodes the benefits of trade openness outweigh the 
higher vulnerability to external shocks. This is not the case, however, 
when we  focus on crashes that were preceded by more stable exchange 
rates (see cols. [3], [4], and [6]).14 
IMFdummy. Countries with IMF  programs in place are less likely to suffer 
crashes the following year. In addition to a possible “credibility effect,” 
this finding could reflect the fact that programs are approved or remain 
in place in countries willing to strengthen their fundamentals. 
For the sample of middle-income countries we  also find that a crash is 
more likely when the current account deficit is large. For the full sample, 
which includes several low-income countries with very large current ac- 
count deficits throughout the period, the current account has the expected 
sign  but  is  statistically  insignificant.  The  finding  that  countries  with 
pegged exchange rates are less likely to suffer crashes of type 1 may simply 
reflect the fact that the rate of depreciation tends to be lower in countries 
with pegged exchange rates than in countries with floating exchange rates 
(the median rate of depreciation in the sample for countries that peg is 
zero, while it is 12 percent for countries with floating exchange rates). In- 
deed, when we  limit the definition of  crisis to countries with low initial 
rates of  depreciation (CRISIS3 or CRISIS4) the coefficient on the peg 
variable changes sign. 
Table 8.9 reports the goodness of fit of the model. As in the case of 
reversals, goodness of fit improves when the sample is restricted to middle- 
income countries. Note also the difference in the classification accuracy 
for the full sample between CRISIS1 and CRISIS2: this is due to the fact 
that the model predicts easily accelerations in the rate of depreciation as- 
sociated with episodes of high inflation. Overall, these results are broadly 
in line with those reported by  Frankel and Rose (1996). They highlight 
domestic factors, such as the degree of overvaluation and the level of re- 
14. Klein and Marion (1997) find that openness significantly reduces the likelihood of a 
devaluation in a sample of Latin American countries that peg their exchange rate. 312  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
Table 8.9  Goodness of Fit: Currency Crash Models 
Predicted 
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serves, and external factors, such as growth and interest rates in industrial 
countries and the terms of trade, that tend to precede currency crashes. 
8.7  Currency Crises and Output Performance 
In this section we characterize output performance after a currency cri- 
sis. The objective is twofold: first, to identify stylized facts regarding the 
behavior of macroeconomic variables before and after crises and, second, 
to investigate which factors help to explain output growth after crises. 
A stylized fact that emerged from the analysis of the previous section is 
that output and consumption growth the year of the crisis are lower than 
the averages during the three preceding years and during the three follow- 
ing years. This finding suggests that we  are indeed picking up events that 
have disruptive effects on macroeconomic  activity, at least in  the short 
run. One telling example is Korea, which experienced a currency crisis 
(according to the first three definitions) in 1980. Its average growth in the 
three years preceding the crisis was above 10 percent; in 1980 output fell 
by close to 3 percent, and in the three successive years growth was back Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  313 
at 8 percent.  In the regression  analysis we  explore the determinants of 
output performance in the three years following a currency crash. Our 
dependent variable is the average growth rate in the three years following 
the crash, as a deviation from the OECD average during the same period. 
Our independent variables  include the average growth rate in the three 
years preceding the crisis and growth rate the year of the crisis (both ex- 
pressed as deviations from the OECD average during those periods), aver- 
age investment rate and current account balance the three years prior to 
the crisis, change in the terms of trade between the two periods, as well as 
ratio of debt to GDP, degree of real exchange rate overvaluation,  GDP 
per capita, real interest rate in the United  States, and ratio  of external 
transfers to GDP, all measured the year before the crisis. Results are pre- 
sented in table 8.10. 
Overall, the most robust predictor of output performance after a crisis 
appears to be the average growth rate before the crisis. We  also find evi- 
dence that countries more open to trade tend to grow faster after currency 
crises. While the latter finding is in line with what we  reported in section 
8.5 for the before-and-after analysis of current account reversals, the for- 
mer is different and suggests a stronger degree of “continuity” in output 
performance in the case of currency crises than in the case of reversals, 
especially for the sample of middle-income countries. The growth rate the 
year of the crisis and the current account balance prior to the crisis are 
not good predictors of subsequent performance, after controlling for other 
growth determinants. It is interesting to note that the real exchange rate 
(or the degree of overvaluation), which seems to play an important role 
both in explaining output performance after reversals and in triggering 
currency crises, is not a good predictor of economic performance after a 
currency crash. A regression  of the growth rate the year of the crisis on 
the set of lagged dependent variables (not reported) also does not find any 
economically and statistically significant effect of the degree of overvalu- 
ation. Finally, in the sample of middle-income countries the investment 
rate prior to the crisis is statistically significant but has the wrong sign. 
These findings also suggest that currency crashes and reversals in cur- 
rent  account  imbalances  have indeed  different  characteristics  and have 
different  impacts on macroeconomic  performance.  The next  section ex- 
plores this issue in more detail. 
8.8  Crises and Reversals: A Comparison 
Are reversals  usually  preceded  by  currency crises? The stylized facts 
presented  in  figures  8.1 through  8.4 and especially  the  time  profile  of 
crashes and reversals presented in tables 8.2 and 8.6 suggest that these two 
events have different characteristics.  Indeed,  table 8.1  1 shows that  only 
around a third of reversals are accompanied by, or preceded by, currency 
crises; the median  rate of depreciation  in the year of a current account Table 8.10  Consequences of Currency Crashes 
Full Sample  Middle-Income Countries 
Variable  CRISIS1  CRISIS2  CRISIS3  CRISIS1  CRISIS2  CRISIS3 
Lagged dependent  0.37** 
Growth crisis year  0.03 
(0.07) 
CA  0.14 
RER  -0.01 
ATT  0.063** 
OPEN  0.058** 









































































































































Note: Dependent variable is average output growth after a currency crash, a three-year average, expressed as deviation from the OECD average during the 
same period. Estimation by OLS with White’s correction for heteroskedasticity. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The explanatory variables CA 
and INV are averages over the three years preceding the event; the variables OPEN, GDP, RER, OT, and DEBTY are levels the year before the event; the 
variable ATT is the percentage change in the average level of the terms of trade between the period after and the period before the event. 
*Statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent level. Table 8.11  Currency Crashes and Reversals 
A. Number of Reversals Preceded by Currency Crashesd 
Size of 
Reversal 
No Window  Window 
Total  CRISISl  CRISIS2  CRISIS3  CRISISl  CRISIS2  CRISIS3  CRISIS4 
3%, full sample  152  54  43  51 
3%, window, full sample  100  31  26  33  24 
3%, window, middle-income 
countries  41  18  14  21  14 
5%,  full sample  117  43  36  43 
5%, window, full sample  77  25  22  27  20 
B. Growth before and after Reversalsh 
Growth before Reversal‘  Growth after Reversald 
Size of Reversal  Total 
and Type of Crisis  Observations  Average  Median  Average  Median 
3%  97  3.5  3.2  3.6  3.6 
3% + CRISISl  30  2.7  2.9  3.1  3.1 
3%, no CRISIS1  67  3.9  3.6  3.8  4.1 
3% + CRISIS3  32  3.4  3.1  3.5  2.8 
3Y0,  no CRISIS3  65  3.6  3.3  4.0  3.6 
’Number of reversals accompanied by currency crashes or preceded in at least one of  the three previous years by  crashes. The current account is defined 
net of official transfers. 
bReversals  do not include adjacent events and are defined on the basis of the current account net of official transfers. They are divided into those accompanied 
or preceded by currency crises (in one of the previous three years) and those that are not. See table 8.6 note for definitions of CRISISl and CRISIS3. 
<Growth  before reversal: average (median) growth the three years prior to a reversal. 
“Growth after reversal: average (median) growth rate the year of the reversal and the two successive years. Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  317 
reversal and in the two preceding years is around 7 percent, well below all 
the thresholds we use for currency crashes.15  We now investigate this issue 
in more detail. 
A first stylized fact is that as expected, when crises precede or accom- 
pany reversals they tend to occur one or two years prior to reversals. A 
second stylized fact is  that reversals are more likely to be  preceded by 
currency crises in Latin America and the Caribbean than they are in Asia. 
For example, for the Frankel-Rose definition of crisis, twelve reversals (out 
of twenty-five) in Latin America were preceded by crashes, but only five 
(out of twenty-nine) in Asia.16 If the definition of crisis is changed so as 
to exclude countries that had high rates of depreciation before crashes 
(i.e., we  use CRISIS3), the numbers change (nine out of twenty-five for 
Latin America and six out of twenty-nine for Asia) but not the qualitative 
finding. For African  countries, around 30  percent of reversals are pre- 
ceded by crises. There are more similarities between the stylized features 
of reversals and crises for the sample of middle-income countries (see the 
exchange rate depreciation panel in fig. 8.2 and the current account panel 
in fig. 8.4). However, as shown in the third row of table 8.11, panel A, the 
fraction of reversals preceded by  exchange rate crashes is still below 50 
percent. In order to shed more light on this issue it would be necessary to 
“classify” reversals according to their most relevant features-a  task for 
future research. 
The final question we  briefly address is whether countries that suffer 
currency crises prior to reversals tend to perform less well after the rever- 
sals. Table 8.1 1, panel B, provides summary statistics for median and aver- 
age growth before and after reversals, separating those preceded by crises 
from those that are  It shows that average and median growth perfor- 
mance after reversals is worse for countries that suffered currency crises 
of type 1, but not for crises of type 3. The explanation for this finding may 
lie in the worse growth performance of countries that suffered bouts of 
high inflation and currency depreciation (which are excluded from crises 
of type 3). 
8.9  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has provided a broad-brush characterization of sharp reduc- 
tions in current account deficits and of currency crises in low- and middle- 
income countries. Reversals in current account imbalances are more likely 
15. The crisis definition does not affect significantly the selection of reversal episodes pre- 
16. This partly reflects the higher incidence of crashes in  Latin America than in Asia 
17. Table  8.1  1,  panel  B,  excludes CRISISZ;  growth  would  be  intermediate  between 
ceded by  crises. 
(table 8.6). 
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to occur in countries that have run persistent deficits and that have low 
reserves and unfavorable terms of trade; they are less likely to occur in 
countries that receive high official transfers and whose debt is largely on 
concessional terms. Growth performance after reversals tends to be better 
in more open economies and in countries whose real exchange rates were 
less appreciated  prior to the reversals. Reversals are not systematically 
associated with declines in growth; indeed, median growth after a reversal 
in the current account is the same as before the reversal. Currency crises 
are more likely to occur when reserves are low,  real exchange rates are 
appreciated, and external conditions are unfavorable-high  interest rates 
and low growth in industrial countries. Growth tends to decline the year 
of the crisis and to recover thereafter. Economies more open to trade seem 
to perform better after crises. A comparison of currency crashes and cur- 
rent account reversals shows that these are, in general, distinct events. Less 
than a third of all reversals are preceded by currency crises, however de- 
fined. This suggests that the conventional wisdom that large nominal de- 
preciations  precede turnarounds in the current  account is not accurate 
and points to the need to look more closely at different types of reversals. 
Several other questions remain open for future research. First of all, the 
probit analyses of both reversals and currency crises is based on a reduced- 
form approach that makes it difficult to give any “structural” interpreta- 
tion to its findings. It would therefore be important to devise ways to dis- 
tinguish  empirically between different mechanisms underlying reversals 
and crises. A second important question is whether swings in the current 
account are merely a reflection of reversals in capital flows; addressing this 
question requires the construction of a measure of capital flows, combin- 
ing current account and reserve data, taking into account the need to 
separate “rescue packages” from “normal” capital inflows. Finally, the be- 
havior of economic policy around the time of reversals and crises could 
be  examined in more detail, and the experience of developing countries 
could be compared to the experience in industrial countries. 
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Appendix B 
Data Sources and Definitions 
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CA  Current account balance (excluding official transfers) as a 
fraction  of  GDP.  Source: World Bank,  World Tables and 
World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.,  various 























GDP per capita (chain rule). Source: Robert Summers and 
Alan  Heston,  Penn  World Tables 5.6,  available at  http:// 
www.pwt.upenn.edu. 
Fiscal balance  (including grants)  as  a  fraction  of  GDP. 
Source: World Tables. 
Official transfers in U.S.  dollars. Source: World Tables. 
Share of  investment in GDP. Source: World Tables. 
Growth rate of  real GDP (constant  1987 prices).  Source: 
World Tables. 
Terms-of-trade  index  (period  average  +  100).  Source: 
World Tables. 
Rate of real exchange rate overvaluation vis-a-vis the U.S. 
dollar, based on relative GDP deflators (percentage devia- 
tion from the average level for 1970-96). 
CPI-based real effective exchange rate index (period average 
+ 100). Source: IMF and authors’ calculations. 
Average share of exports and imports in GDP. Source: Au- 
thors’ calculations based on World Tables. 
Foreign exchange reserves in  months  of  imports. Source: 
World  Bank,  Global  Development  Finance  (Washington, 
D.C., various issues). 
Foreign exchange reserves as a fraction of M2. Source: Au- 
thors’ calculations based on World Tables and Global Devel- 
opment Finance. 
Ratio of external debt to exports. Source: Global Develop- 
men  t Finance. 
Ratio  of  external debt  to GNP.  Source:  Global Develop- 
ment Finance. 
Ratio of interest payments on external debt to GNP. Source: 
Global Development Finance. 
Share of concessional debt in total debt. Source: Global De- 
velopment Finance. 
Share of public debt in total debt, Source: Global Develop- 
ment Finance. 
Ratio of  variable rate external debt to total external debt. 
Source: Global Development Finance. 
Ratio of domestic credit to GDP. Source: World Tables. 
Share of short-term debt in total debt. Source: Global Devel- 
opment Finance. 
Net FDI flows as a fraction of GDP. Source: Global Devel- 
opment Finance. 
Net portfolio flows as a fraction of  GDP. Source:  Global 
Development Finance, 
U.S. prime lending rate, deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator. Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  321 
Source:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics  (Washing- 
ton, D.C., various issues). 
Real growth rate in OECD countries. Source: International 
Financial Statistics. 
Dummy variable taking the value one if the exchange rate is 
fixed  or fluctuates within a narrow band, and zero other- 
wise. Source: Cottarelli and Giannini (1997) and IMF, Ex- 
change Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions  (Washing- 
ton, D.C., various issues). 
Dummy variable taking the value one if the country has an 
IMF program in place for at least six months during the 
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Comment  Jaume Ventura 
This is the latest paper in a series by  Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996a, 
1996b, 1998) that has taught us much regarding current account sustain- 
ability and sharp reductions in current accounts. In this new installment 
of the saga, the authors also include a description of  large depreciation 
episodes. In this brief comment, I focus on two issues. First, I raise a meth- 
odological point that I hope the authors interpret as a challenge for their 
future research. Second, I stress some of the implications of their findings 
regarding large depreciations. 
Section 8.4, on current account reversals, contains a description of how 
the key macroeconomic variables (with special attention to growth) be- 
have during a current account reversal.’ In particular, they find that on 
average these episodes tend to be preceded by unfavorable terms of trade, 
low foreign exchange reserves, a high interest burden of external debt, low 
consumption growth, and a high budget deficit. After the sharp reduction 
in the current account deficit takes place, on average most of these indica- 
tors improve, although the growth rate remains at roughly the same level 
Jaume Ventura is the Pentti Kouri Associate Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts 
Institute of  Technology and  research  associate  of  the  Centre for  Economic Policy  Re- 
search, London. 
1. Section 8.4 also contains an attempt to use multivariate probit analysis to find good 
indicators of current account reversals. However, this effort is marred by the use of the cur- 
rent account variable as a regressor. This variable was used to construct the dependent vari- 
able, and as a result, it cannot be used as an explanatory variable. 1  suspect that the numbers 
might change substantially if the probit analysis were properly executed. 324  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin 
as before the reversal. These results regarding average behavior are beauti- 
fully summarized in figures 8.1 and 8.2. 
But how  do we  interpret these findings? In other words, what is  the 
question being answered by  these figures? Before tackling this issue, it is 
worth remembering that economic theory offers a variety of reasons for 
why  these reversals take place. Consider the following three possibilities: 
1.  A country receives a bad shock to productivity or the terms of trade, 
which is expected to last for an extended period of time. As a result, do- 
mestic investment falls and capital moves out of the country. The current 
account goes into surplus. In this story, the reversal is accompanied by a 
fall in output and a real depreciation. 
2.  A country receives a good transitory  income shock. Spending in- 
creases by  less than output, as agents try to smooth consumption over 
time. The current account goes into surplus. In this story, the reversal is 
accompanied by  an increase in output and a real appreciation. 
3.  Foreign  interest  rates  increase,  international  investors lose confi- 
dence in  a country, or alternatively, the credit constraint of a country is 
tightened. Capital moves out of  the country, spending falls, and the cur- 
rent account goes into surplus. In this story, there might be a fall in output 
if  foreign financing is necessary to keep alive some investment projects 
with high future return. Also, the exchange rate might depreciate. 
Stories 1 and 3 suggest that a current account reversal should be accom- 
panied by a depreciation of the currency and a reduction in output. Story 
2 suggests instead that a current account reversal should be accompanied 
by an appreciation of the currency and an increase in output. It should be 
obvious to the reader that other stories are possible with different impli- 
cations. The only point I want to make here is that there are, in principle, 
many varieties of current account reversals, each of them caused by  a dif- 
ferent type of shock. With this in mind, consider the following two ques- 
tions: 
Q1.  Assume we know that a reversal will take place but we do not know 
why: what should we expect the macroeconomic picture to look like? 
Q2. Assume we  know that a reversal will take place because of reason 
X: what should we  expect the macroeconomic picture to look like? 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 are the response to Q1. The sample paths depicted 
in these figures could be roughly interpreted as weighted averages of the 
sample paths of each type of current account reversal, with weights that 
correspond to the frequency with which each type occurs in the data. For 
instance, the authors find that there is little effect on growth after a rever- 
sal. Is this because reversals have little impact on growth? Or is it because 
about half of the reversals in the sample are of type 1 or 3, while the other 
half are of type 2? The answer is not clear. Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises  325 
A much more interesting question is 42. To  answer it, we  would have 
to establish a typology of current account reversals and then separate the 
observed episodes according to this typology. While the information pro- 
vided in this paper is useful, I think the authors should try to address 42. 
This effort would be more useful to the academic economist who wants to 
use the results of this paper to learn about parameters of the economy. It 
would also be more useful to the policymaker who has information regard- 
ing the shock that the country is experiencing.2 
The second point I want to raise concerns the interpretation of the evi- 
dence on currency crises. The methodology used to determine episodes 
of  “currency crisis” consists of  picking periods in which there are large 
depreciations. Once we  look at the data this way,  the evidence in figures 
8.3 and 8.4 can be interpreted as showing that countries follow textbook 
policy prescriptions (unless they receive a sizable amount of concessional 
debt). In particular, countries devalue whenever the terms of trade worsen, 
there is low growth and high interest rates in the OECD, reserves are low, 
and the currency is overvalued! In such circumstances, there is a tempo- 
rary  output  loss,  which  is  consistent with  old-fashioned J-curve argu- 
ments. 
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